Read-mostly, isolated by the database, audited.
It reads events and reference data, and any write to your systems is a named, audited action. Tenant isolation is enforced by the database itself, so an application bug cannot widen what anyone can see. Where we hold no attestation, we say so.
In plain termsWhat it can see, what it can change, and who is recorded.
At a glance
Read-mostly
Events and reference data in. No background write path.
Isolation in the database
Row-level security, so the application’s failure mode is closed.
Identity you already run
Single sign-on over OIDC, provisioning over SCIM, MFA at login.
Gaps listed
A trust page that states what is not claimed.
The questions a security review starts with
- What access does it need to our systems, and what can it write?
- Where does it run, and where does our data live?
- Can one tenant’s data reach another’s?
- What happens to events it cannot map?
- Which attestations do you hold, and which do you not?
What touches your systems
What touches your systems
- Your systems: Events and reference dataLeads to: Event intake (read)
- Event intake: Read-mostly by defaultLeads to: State and evidence; Dead-letter view (cannot be mapped)
- Dead-letter view: Failures kept, with the reason
- State and evidence: Isolated by the databaseLeads to: Named, audited action
- Named, audited action: The only write path. Recorded.Leads to: Your systems (explicit write)
What is enforced
| Control | How it is enforced |
|---|---|
| Tenant isolation | Row-level security in the database, not application filtering |
| Access | Role and workspace checked on every request |
| Identity | Single sign-on over OIDC, directory provisioning over SCIM, MFA at login |
| Audit trail | Every action recorded with the acting user, scoped to the tenant |
| Limits and budgets | Evaluated by the platform, per domain |
| Model promotion gate | Refuses on provenance, divergence, null-baseline and unmeasured-horizon checks |
Isolation that survives a bug
Isolation is enforced by the database, not the application
- Tenant A usersLeads to: Application
- Tenant B usersLeads to: Application
- Application: Runs as an application role, not a superuserLeads to: Database with row-level isolation
- Database with row-level isolation: The control lives hereLeads to: Only Tenant A rows; Only Tenant B rows
- Only Tenant A rows
- Only Tenant B rows
Concerns a security reviewer is likely to raise
| The concern | The answer |
|---|---|
| You hold no SOC 2 or ISO 27001. | Correct, and the trust page says so. Ask for current status, the penetration test date and scope, and the data processing documents; we answer the questionnaire directly. |
| Will it write into production? | Only through explicit, named, audited actions. There is no background write path. |
| Where does our data live? | In infrastructure you control: single-host containers, Kubernetes, or your cloud account with a managed database. There is no shared hosted estate. |
| What happens to bad events? | They land in a dead-letter view with the reason. Nothing is silently dropped. |
What we do not claim
Bring the questionnaire
Bring:
- The questionnaire
- Your network and identity constraints
You leave with the tenancy, audit and deployment answers, demonstrated.
Put your security reviewer in the room
Bring the questionnaire. A conversation is faster than a document.